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Paradoxes and Flaws in Speaking About Value 
Absract 
This article examines two main values in the contemporary social and political 
discourse: liberal constitutional democracy and civil society. It tries to show that 
in both cases there are inconsistencies in using these terms. In the first case, 
several contradictions appear making democracy an oxymoron term; canceming 
ci vii society it tums out that what fıts best the criteria of this concept is usually not 
associated with it. This analysis is compared with the Neo-Hegelian political 
views of Giovanni Gentile's follower, Benito Mussolini. Under logical analysis, 
Mussolini ' s ideas prove to be consistent and coherent although sound strange at 
first glance. 
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Değere İlişkin Konuşmalarda Ortaya Çıkan Hatalar ve 
Paradokslar 
Özet 
Bu makalede çağdaş sosyal ve politik söylem içerisindeki başlıca iki değer 
incelenmektedir: liberal anayasal demokrasi ve sivi.l toplum. Bu terimleri 
kullanıldığı her iki durumda da bazı tutarszılıkların bulunduğu gösterilmeye 
çalışılacaktır. İlk durumda, demokrasi oksimoron bir terim haline getirildiğinde 
bir takım çelişkiler ortaya çıkmaktadır; bu, sivil toplum söz konusu olduğunda bu 
kavramın kriterine en çok uyan şeyin, genellikle kavramın kendisiyle ilişkisi 
olmadığı konusunu tersyüz etmektedir. Bu analiz, Giovanni Gemile'nin takipçisi 
olan Benito Mussolini'nin Yeni-Hegelci pol itik görüşleriyle karşılaştınlmaktadır. 
İlk bakışta tuhaf karşıtanmasına rağmen Mussolini ' nin görüşleri , mantıksal analiz 
altında tutarlı olduğunu kanıtlarnaktadır. 
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ı. Hidden contradictions in current discourse on values 
In October 1928, Benito Mussolini gave a speech at the anniversary meeting of 
the editors o f Italian fasc ist newspapers claiming that they had the unique opporıunity to 
work in free media as they lived in a totalitarian state. At a first glance, such a sıaıemenı 
is either arrogant or standson the edge of absurdity. Ho wever, as we will be witnessing 
later on, under more precise scrutiny Mussolini ' s co mment turns out to be neither. Leı 's 
now leave for the time being the enthusiastic Ita lian spirit and proceed to our own day. 
W hat can we discover if decide to examine the most popular conıemporary value 
democracy? There are several versio ns of democracy, but the most popular one is "the 
liberal constitutional democracy". I am going to analyze consecutively each of the 
compo ne nts of this extended value. Let's begin with the democratic component. 
U sually, two main e lements are claimed as constituting democracy, i.e., a) rule of 
majority and b) po litical participa tio n. 1 These two se lf-evident aspects shine brightly (or 
at least are expected to do so) on the surface o f any democratic government. 
Nevertheless, the predo minant practice of de veloped democracies casts significant 
doubt on the presence o f these elements. As a rule, po litical participation tends to be 
well below 50%. If we take as an example recent elections for the EU Parliament in 
Bulgaria in May 2007, we can see that little less than 30% of the electorate took pan in 
them. The governing coali tio n won half of the seats; therefore, less than 15% supponed 
its candidates. It is obvious tha t the real majority remains indiffereni and si lenı. Similar 
situatio ns prove that democratic procedures and institutions today lead to an aristocratic 
rule of the mi nority, that is, to a strange formatio n, which can be jusıifıably called 
democratic aristocracy. 2 T his is ho w we encounte r the fırst paradox in the 
contemporary d iscourse on values; it is a contradiction in terms or conıradicrio in 
adjecto. 
Speaking about the libera l component, it has three substantial principles: a) 
concern for the individual, b) po litical equality, and c) c ivil liberties being of paramount 
importance. On the background of the grand coalitio n te ndeney in current politics, when 
the who le party spectrum is occupied from left to rioht throuoh the center, there is no 
o o 
much space left for any of these elemenıs. Within a grand coalition, concern for the 
~ndividual withdraws to the back since what is rea lly si gni fıcant is to cope with the 
ı mpossible, i.e., to keep together and utilize opposite, even contradictory, positions. 
P olitical equality remains only de jure, because de facto any political actions are of no 
use since all o ptions have been already exhausted: the e lectorate has no choice left but 
to look passively at what is go ing on at the go verning scene with no hope to change 
whatsoever. The similar is the situation with c ivi l liberties except for one curious 
nuance: _c ivil liberties exist bo th de jure and de facto. They can be practiced in the most 
unreso:aıned way namely because they have no impact on the political life. Drawıng 
upo n lıberal procedures, power has achieved such a status that it oets in charge of the 
en tire political li fe. It has achieved the fina) o bjectio n of anyo power leaving the 
M~ J. Skidmore, ldeologies: Politics in Action, New York: HBJ, 1989, p. 14 . 
lt ı s more app~oprıate to speak about oligarchy instead of aristocracy as the ruling minonty 
ser~es not the ını~rests ~f the nation but i ts own group or personal interests. However, from a 
logıcal poınt of vıew, thıs does not make difference and remains a contradictio in adjecto. 
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opposi tion (as fa~ asany has remained) in dismay. This isa new totalitarianism grown 
up on lıberal ınstıtutıons; it produces anather contradiction in terms, liberal 
totalitarianism. 
Finally, the consti tutional component is not free of paradoxes either. 
Constitutional component, in the extended expressian about democracy, is meant to 
guarantee that majority is not going to abuse its power subjugating minority under its 
dictatorship. This is the reason why demecratic constitutions normally provide a 
number of checks and balances that make sure minority can enjoy its civil liberties, 
political equality, and can take part in political life. However, in the current political 
cırcumstances the wording of the constitution has to be turned upside down in order ro 
make any sense, that is, ruled majority passesses certain rights that the ruling minority 
cannot deprive it from; one reads rninority but means majority and vice versa. 
It is time to go back to Mussolini 's statement which we mentioned earlier. 
Actually, he says that media could either be self-dependent-a, or depend on 
corporations-b, or on private individual--c, or on a certain party--d. By b and c he 
envisages demecratic countries and by d means Bolshevic party. In Italy media depends 
neither on b, nor on c, nor on d; therefore, it is self-dependent-a.
3 
This is a simple 
example of modus tollendo ponens. Here the crucial po int in Mussoli ni ' s reasoning is 
clarified: media in Italy can be self-dependent and not to be tom apart by contradictory 
interesrs of profit and power seekers namely because Italy isa totalitarian state
4
. In fact, 
Il Duce's argument goes according to Hegelian tradition and, in particular, according to 
the Neo-Hegelian ideas of Giovanni Gentile. Gentile teaches about organic unity of the 
society and the state when individuals, families, and communities have the same goal 
and that very goal is the state. In thi s sense, media coincides with the state, cannot have 
different purposes from the state, and due to th is is self-dependent. 
It looks !ike that Mussolini's claim is not so absurd at least within the Hegelian 
logic. On the other hand, contemporary democratic discourse turns out to be full of 
contradictions-aristocratic democracy, totalitarian liberalism, minority meaning 
majority, ete. It is worth to point out here that democratic and fascist discourse are 
viewed from different logical positions when the first is found to be inconsistent and the 
second--consistent. In the first case, contradictions arise from the point of view of 
classical logic, which does not a llow contradictions in valid reasoning. Mussolini's 
cia im makes sense o nly when it is considered against the standard of Hegelian thinking 
(although in this case not because Hegelian logic adapts smoothly contradictions and 
even needs them). The way of thinking of the demecratic discourse partially resembles 
what Hegel calls negative dialectics. In negative dialectics, contradictions are explicated 
but they stand side by side wi th no interaction and cannot be resolved in something 
third. That is, negative dialectics belongs to the limited level of intellectual faculty of 
understanding and has not achieved yet the level ofreason to which speculative thinking 
belongs. According to Hegel, there are two forms of negative dialectics-skepticism 
and relativism; they both are interim and tend to be substituted by speculative th inking. 
Skepticism and relativism are quite problematic ways of thinking while oxymoron 
Berıiıo Mussolini , Scrilti e discorsi, vol. V I, Milano: Ulıico Hoepli Editore, 1934, p. 250 
Mussolini apııarently den i es the privi lege of being a totalitarian sıate to the Soviet Union. 
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thinking of the current demecratic discourse seems to cope smoothly with its own 
contradictory nature. The principle of this later type of negative dialectics is neither 
skepticism nor relativism but domination. All contradictions are utilized for the sake of 
dornination. Contradic tions are masked and neglected, demands of reasoning are 
ignored too, because the only thing that counts is carrying out dorninatio n. 
2. Some deficiencies of term 'ci vii society' 
Although ci vii society Renaissance looks !ike being over, this term sti li carries at 
least some implicit importance. Among many definitions and descriptions of what civil 
society is, Charles Taylor 's contribution is especially elucidating and useful. In an 
intluential article published in early 90-s, he offers three criteria for which social and 
po litical reality should be considered as matching the concept of civil society: "( l) In a 
minimal sense, civil society exists where there are free associations that are not under 
the tutelage of state power. (2) Ina stronger sense, ci vii society exists where society as a 
whole can structure itself and coordinate its actions through such free associations. (3.) 
As an alternative or supplement to the second sense, we can speak of civil society 
whatever the ensemble of associations can significantly determine or inflect the course 
of state po licy."5 
No doubt that almost everything known as civil society can be subsumed under 
the minimal sense. However, thi s sense is too broad to provide anything specifıc 
capable of being used for any social and political analysis. The second and third senses 
are much richer and it is worthwhile to concentrate on them. What is usually meant by 
independent organizations of citizens barely can qualify for the assessment that society 
is structured through these o rganizations. Various networks of non-government or non-
profil organizations can be considered at best as a detail o f the social structure but not 
the structure itself. Even less, the NGO ensemble can significantly determine or inflict 
the course of the state policy. Does this mean that ci vii society is in a fetus state in the 
West as well as in the new democracies in the Eastern block? Charles Taylor admits that 
not everything is perfect with civil society even in the most developed democracies, but 
stili it is possible to match empiric reality with the theoretical criteria. This can be done 
along the lines of the notia n of corporativism. Looking at contemporary corporaıions 
within the social structure, it is not difficult to d iscern that they come very close under 
Taylor's second and third criterion. Furthermorc, they are capablc of inflicting such 
damages on a state that this can put under question its very existence (think about 
damages that developed countries suffer annually from relocation of businesses to 
friendly tax policy places and flexible labor markets). All this inevitably proves that 
ci vii society has already reached a very developed level, but its essential ingredienis are 
not Green Peace, Helsinki Watch, and various charitable organizations as usually is 
assumed. 
It is not a seeret that corporations are for profı t and proıection of interest. of 
citizens and work for more prosperous civil environment is either a beneficial side 
Charles Taylor. "lnvoking Civil Society," in: Contenıporary Political Philosophy: An 
Aııtlıology, Robert E. Goodin and Philip Petıit, edr., Cambridge, MA: Blackwell , 1996, p. 68 
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e~ect of their day to day businesses o r an intended po licy aimed at increasing profıt by 
dıfferent means. There are several trends wi thin which corporations work in order to 
provide services to various groups of citizens. On the first place, efforts are applied to 
improving education and healthcare of their own employees and their families as well as 
their general living conditions; then, often are addressed needs and concerns of the 
population in the areas where a gi ve n corporation opera tes; through their foundations, 
corporations even dea! with a limited number of national and international issues 
relevant for the general citizenry including higher education and research. 
In spite of the increasing corporati vist awareness about needs of citizens, statc is 
much more instrumental in providing well bei ng of its citizens than civil society (both 
in the form of NGOs and corporations). Not only welfare states within the EU 
(Scandinavian countries in particular) dedicated special attention to elevate the life 
quality of their citizens. But even in the US a significant tendeney of concern for the 
wellbeing of their population can be followed throughout the 20ıh century. The first 
significant improvement in the social sphere was marked by Franklin D. Roosevelt's the 
New Deal introducing Social Security, which allawed citizens to receive a certain 
federal allowance when retire. Besides, the New Dea! brought "national protection for 
collective bargaining, minimum wage legislation, insurance for bank deposits, 
workmen 's compensation, regulation of banks and stock markets, additional protection 
for workers, and regulations on industry and employers".6 Later on, Lyndon Johnson's 
Great Society introduced Medical Care (a federal funding for elderly citizens), federal 
assistance to education, and various programs of the "W ar on Poverty".
7 
The idea of corporativism was not a lien at all to Mussolini 's fascist state. 
Furthermore, it constituted the practical center of the organic unity of the state and 
society. Corporations were meant to establish the unique third way besides capitalism 
and communism. They were set in the form of governing councils representing equally 
capital and labor.8 Representatives of e mployers and unions were expected to cooperate 
for the sake of the nation (and at the same time of any single individual) embodied by 
the state and not just for the benefit of the corporation itself. Corporations covered all 
industries; what allawed them to encompass the entire population and all spheres of life. 
It can be summarized that there are fo ur types of taking care of the needs of large 
citizenry over 20th century: NGO sector, the capitalisı corporations, the capitalisı state, 
and the fascist corporations.9 The first one is associated with civil society, but as we 
tried to show here, it is in charge only of a fragment of civil society and not of the most 
important one. The capitali sı corporations play a significant role in providing for the 
needs of the citizens (outside the remuneration they give to their employees), but their 
deficiency is in a very limited compass of their charity and other forms of financial care 
including precisely selected oroups: own employees and their families, residents of the 
areas where a given compan~ is present, some o ther citizens matching special criteria 
Max J. Skidmore, Jdeologies: Politics in Action, p. 72 
lbid., p. 72 
Patricia Knight, Mussolini and Fascism, London and New York: Routledge, 2003, p. 55-56 
There isa fıfth type-the socialisı state, but it is principally different from the others and goes 
beyond the scope of the present article. 
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(gifted students or prominent/promi sing scholars in certain field). Moreover, there is 
anather theoretical and moral feature, which bears practical consequences-all 
corporative non-profıt activities are undertaken for the sake of the fina! check cashing. 
Capitalisı state, at list during the pre-Thatcher/Reagan times, excel s both the NGO 
sector and corporate concerns for the citizen civic activities, social and personal needs. 
Fascist corporations, lack the profit centered deficiency of the capi talisı ones; besides, 
they cover the whole population like in the capitalisı state approach. 
It will not be a far-fetched claim to say that concerning civil society another 
irony is taking place (although not so striking like in the case of the democracy 
discourse): on the one hand, the core of the civil society is located among the principle 
share halders of the big industries and, on the other, civil and social initiative provided 
by Mussolini's corporations is in no way inferior to the conditions for personal 
development a democratic state keeps ready for i ts citizens. 
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